Joe and Tina Shaffer in St. Paul write asking Cohen about their ruined wardrobe:
"While staining the frame of a mirror in our house on a hot day, a skilled but distracted worker had a large fan blowing on him. Behind him were thousands of dollars of our clothes, which ended up spattered with brown stain. Efforts to remove the stain were unavailing. The worker’s company deducted the cost of the clothes from our bill, then asked to keep them. We declined and plan to donate them to a charity. O.K.?" (The Ethicist, 1/25/09)
Cohen makes an argument from analogy that the Shaffers should be allowed to keep their clothes: "If you badly damage your car and put in an insurance claim, the insurance company doesn’t come by the house to pick up the debris. It is not buying scrap metal; it is making good your loss. The imperfect painter, same deal." But this is simply untrue! I know (unfortunately from personal experience) that this is precisely what many insurance companies do when a car is written off as a total loss. Companies will pay out fair market value for one's car in the case of a total loss. The insurance company will then keep the proceeds from a scrap sale of the car or its parts. What's more, if one is permitted to keep the car, the insurance company will pay fair market value minus what they would have made from the scrap sale. Now, this is not to say that Cohen is wrong that the Shaffers should be allowed to keep their clothing; but the analogy does not help. An interesting question: Does the fact that this is common practice among insurance companies help serve, minimally, to make the painters' request reasonable, regardless of what obligations one takes the Shaffers to have?
Monday, January 26, 2009
Monday, January 12, 2009
An appletini a day...
An R.N. from Tucson writes asking Cohen about endorsement of her new margarita mix:
"I am a registered nurse three days a week at a hospital and a bartender one day a week at a country club. I am about to launch an all-natural, premium margarita mix and want to include on the label that it is endorsed by a nurse — me. Ethical?" (The Ethicist, 1/2/09)
I agree with the spirit of Cohen's response, which is that to the extent that this endorsement misleads the public, it is ethically problematic. But Cohen takes this to mean that the endorsement would, in fact, be inappropriate; I'm not so certain.
Cohen writes to the R.N. that the proposed endorsement "suggests that your training and experience have convinced you that there is a medical benefit to drinking (all-natural, premium) margaritas." I think this is right, in a sense, but it may not be ethically relevant. Implicature is complicated. We do not, for example, fault Toys 'R' Us for falsely implying that shopping at their stores may slow the aging process. We don't do this because we understand that while in some sense they are suggesting something that is false, this implication is not meant to be taken seriously. And we know that this implication is not meant to be taken seriously because we understand that no (reasonable) person would take it seriously. Now, perhaps I am overestimating the public—or have unreasonably high standards of reasonableness—but I find it doubtful that many are naive enough to believe that any medical professional would seriously suggest that he or she believes any alcoholic beverage to be medically beneficial (setting aside current findings about wine, etc.).
At this point, one might be suspicious: Why would this R.N. bother to endorse the product in this manner unless s/he thought that people would take it seriously? First, it might be that s/he would not. It is possible that this particular R.N. does, in fact, believe that this endorsement will get people to buy the product because of its purported medical benefits. If this is the case, it may or may not matter ethically. This depends on the extent to which one takes intentions to be ethically relevant. Those who take them to be so may find fault with the proposed endorsement because it would be offered with the intention to deceive. Others, however, may consider only the (expected) results of the endorsement, and thus, if they agree with me that the intended deception would fail, may find no fault with it.
But I also think it likely that this R.N. has no intention to deceive whatsoever. More likely, the R.N. is employing a clever marketing strategy. The very fact that the endorsement would have such a ludicrous implication could help make the product more popular. I imagine a retro 50s design, hearkening back to doctors' endorsements of cigarettes: a canister with a label boasting a nurse in perfect white dress, cap and stockings holding up a margarita with a giant grin. Or maybe an "okay" hand sign and a wink. (In fact, I think this sort of design would help remove any concern of deception). Anyway, perhaps I'm a sucker, but if that was on the shelf next to the Margaritaville stuff, there's a good chance I'd buy it.
"I am a registered nurse three days a week at a hospital and a bartender one day a week at a country club. I am about to launch an all-natural, premium margarita mix and want to include on the label that it is endorsed by a nurse — me. Ethical?" (The Ethicist, 1/2/09)
I agree with the spirit of Cohen's response, which is that to the extent that this endorsement misleads the public, it is ethically problematic. But Cohen takes this to mean that the endorsement would, in fact, be inappropriate; I'm not so certain.
Cohen writes to the R.N. that the proposed endorsement "suggests that your training and experience have convinced you that there is a medical benefit to drinking (all-natural, premium) margaritas." I think this is right, in a sense, but it may not be ethically relevant. Implicature is complicated. We do not, for example, fault Toys 'R' Us for falsely implying that shopping at their stores may slow the aging process. We don't do this because we understand that while in some sense they are suggesting something that is false, this implication is not meant to be taken seriously. And we know that this implication is not meant to be taken seriously because we understand that no (reasonable) person would take it seriously. Now, perhaps I am overestimating the public—or have unreasonably high standards of reasonableness—but I find it doubtful that many are naive enough to believe that any medical professional would seriously suggest that he or she believes any alcoholic beverage to be medically beneficial (setting aside current findings about wine, etc.).
At this point, one might be suspicious: Why would this R.N. bother to endorse the product in this manner unless s/he thought that people would take it seriously? First, it might be that s/he would not. It is possible that this particular R.N. does, in fact, believe that this endorsement will get people to buy the product because of its purported medical benefits. If this is the case, it may or may not matter ethically. This depends on the extent to which one takes intentions to be ethically relevant. Those who take them to be so may find fault with the proposed endorsement because it would be offered with the intention to deceive. Others, however, may consider only the (expected) results of the endorsement, and thus, if they agree with me that the intended deception would fail, may find no fault with it.
But I also think it likely that this R.N. has no intention to deceive whatsoever. More likely, the R.N. is employing a clever marketing strategy. The very fact that the endorsement would have such a ludicrous implication could help make the product more popular. I imagine a retro 50s design, hearkening back to doctors' endorsements of cigarettes: a canister with a label boasting a nurse in perfect white dress, cap and stockings holding up a margarita with a giant grin. Or maybe an "okay" hand sign and a wink. (In fact, I think this sort of design would help remove any concern of deception). Anyway, perhaps I'm a sucker, but if that was on the shelf next to the Margaritaville stuff, there's a good chance I'd buy it.
Tuesday, January 6, 2009
The Nutty Adviser
A teacher from Sarasota Springs writes asking Cohen about a "Pro-Life Day of Solidarity" being held at the teacher's school:
"At the public high school where I teach, a school-sponsored student club, Sharing Our Spirit, staged a 'Pro-Life Day of Silent Solidarity' during school hours. Students wore red armbands and did not speak. The club’s faculty adviser sent an e-mail to the entire faculty, including this: 'They will be standing on behalf of the one-third of their generation that have been innocent victims of abortion.' Was the students’ activity legitimate? The adviser’s?" (The Ethicist, 1/2/09)
In his reply, Cohen writes that the adviser's email to the faculty was appropriate but, in his opinion, "nutty." I wish Cohen would say a bit more about why this email is so "nutty." As far as we know, Cohen has seen only the one line of the email we have all seen: "They will be standing on behalf of the one-third of their generation that have been innocent victims of abortion." What exactly about this is "nutty?" Presumably, Cohen is not taking issue with the claim that the students are standing against abortion. So, it seems safe to presume that what made the claim "nutty" was either the statistic or the idea that abortions have "innocent victims."
As to the statistic, from what I can find it is off, but not by a ridiculous amount. Students currently in high school are most likely to have been born between 1991 and 1995. According to these statistics, the percentage of pregnancies terminated in legal abortions ranged from 25.9% to 27.5% during those years. Obviously, this is less than one-third, but it is also more than one-quarter, and given that there were likely some unreported abortions, the one-third claim may be excessive, but (at least to me) does not qualify as "nutty."
As to the "innocent victims": Whether or not fetuses can be considered "innocents" is contentious. This is not to say that they might be "guilty" in some way, but rather that if fetuses are not persons, then it is strange to call them innocents, much as it might seem strange to call one's thumb "an innocent." Furthermore, "victim" tends to connote wrong-doing, and so to call the fetus a victim is to suggest that the abortion wrongs the fetus—again, contentious. But "nutty?" Certainly, almost anyone who is pro-life would feel comfortable referring to aborted fetuses as innocent victims. (There are exceptions, but they are too far afield to worry about here.) Now, perhaps Cohen is suggesting that all pro-lifers are "nutty"; this is certainly a position one might take (whether it's an intellectually respectable one is another question). But barring this, I see nothing especially "nutty" about the text of the email.
Consider also the beginning and end of Cohen's reply:
"If the school rightly permits students to form clubs irrespective of ideology, from protesting the Iraq war to promoting a pre-emptive attack on Mars, there is no reason to bar this one."
"Although the club’s message is expressed in secular terms, anti-abortion activism is so often bound up in religious sentiment that a religious message can be implicit. When the adviser of a school-sponsored club takes up religious advocacy, the school must intervene."
It is clear here that Cohen is in favor of schools' permitting students to form clubs no matter what ideology those clubs represent. This should, of course, include religious ideologies. And, in fact, many public schools (including several I've attended) have clubs dedicated to one or more religions. If students form a Christian club and the members of that club wish to demonstrate an explicitly religiously-informed opposition to abortion, I fail to see the problem. Surely, there should be a place for a faculty member (Christian or otherwise) to help these students organize this movement, so long as the adviser does not personally engage in religious advocacy. Of course, Cohen might recognize this possibility, but what he writes may be seen as taking issue not only with an adviser's religious advocacy, but with the religious message itself that may be implicit in a pro-life platform. So long as it is the students, and not the school or its representatives, that deliver this message, it is not clear that there is anything ethically problematic going on.
Addendum (1/14/09):
A friend commented to me that perhaps Cohen meant not that the text of the email was "nutty," but that sending the email was. The email is worded in a way that might be seen as indicating that the adviser stands behind these students and their actions. While it was appropriate for the adviser to alert the faculty to what was going on, some might think it was (at least) bizarre of her to do so in such a loaded way. I think that how "nutty" sending such an email would be depends largely on what kind of relationship one has with one's colleagues. But given the reaction of at least one of this adviser's colleagues, I can certainly understand why Cohen would see sending this particular email as "nutty," if that's what he meant.
"At the public high school where I teach, a school-sponsored student club, Sharing Our Spirit, staged a 'Pro-Life Day of Silent Solidarity' during school hours. Students wore red armbands and did not speak. The club’s faculty adviser sent an e-mail to the entire faculty, including this: 'They will be standing on behalf of the one-third of their generation that have been innocent victims of abortion.' Was the students’ activity legitimate? The adviser’s?" (The Ethicist, 1/2/09)
In his reply, Cohen writes that the adviser's email to the faculty was appropriate but, in his opinion, "nutty." I wish Cohen would say a bit more about why this email is so "nutty." As far as we know, Cohen has seen only the one line of the email we have all seen: "They will be standing on behalf of the one-third of their generation that have been innocent victims of abortion." What exactly about this is "nutty?" Presumably, Cohen is not taking issue with the claim that the students are standing against abortion. So, it seems safe to presume that what made the claim "nutty" was either the statistic or the idea that abortions have "innocent victims."
As to the statistic, from what I can find it is off, but not by a ridiculous amount. Students currently in high school are most likely to have been born between 1991 and 1995. According to these statistics, the percentage of pregnancies terminated in legal abortions ranged from 25.9% to 27.5% during those years. Obviously, this is less than one-third, but it is also more than one-quarter, and given that there were likely some unreported abortions, the one-third claim may be excessive, but (at least to me) does not qualify as "nutty."
As to the "innocent victims": Whether or not fetuses can be considered "innocents" is contentious. This is not to say that they might be "guilty" in some way, but rather that if fetuses are not persons, then it is strange to call them innocents, much as it might seem strange to call one's thumb "an innocent." Furthermore, "victim" tends to connote wrong-doing, and so to call the fetus a victim is to suggest that the abortion wrongs the fetus—again, contentious. But "nutty?" Certainly, almost anyone who is pro-life would feel comfortable referring to aborted fetuses as innocent victims. (There are exceptions, but they are too far afield to worry about here.) Now, perhaps Cohen is suggesting that all pro-lifers are "nutty"; this is certainly a position one might take (whether it's an intellectually respectable one is another question). But barring this, I see nothing especially "nutty" about the text of the email.
Consider also the beginning and end of Cohen's reply:
"If the school rightly permits students to form clubs irrespective of ideology, from protesting the Iraq war to promoting a pre-emptive attack on Mars, there is no reason to bar this one."
"Although the club’s message is expressed in secular terms, anti-abortion activism is so often bound up in religious sentiment that a religious message can be implicit. When the adviser of a school-sponsored club takes up religious advocacy, the school must intervene."
It is clear here that Cohen is in favor of schools' permitting students to form clubs no matter what ideology those clubs represent. This should, of course, include religious ideologies. And, in fact, many public schools (including several I've attended) have clubs dedicated to one or more religions. If students form a Christian club and the members of that club wish to demonstrate an explicitly religiously-informed opposition to abortion, I fail to see the problem. Surely, there should be a place for a faculty member (Christian or otherwise) to help these students organize this movement, so long as the adviser does not personally engage in religious advocacy. Of course, Cohen might recognize this possibility, but what he writes may be seen as taking issue not only with an adviser's religious advocacy, but with the religious message itself that may be implicit in a pro-life platform. So long as it is the students, and not the school or its representatives, that deliver this message, it is not clear that there is anything ethically problematic going on.
Addendum (1/14/09):
A friend commented to me that perhaps Cohen meant not that the text of the email was "nutty," but that sending the email was. The email is worded in a way that might be seen as indicating that the adviser stands behind these students and their actions. While it was appropriate for the adviser to alert the faculty to what was going on, some might think it was (at least) bizarre of her to do so in such a loaded way. I think that how "nutty" sending such an email would be depends largely on what kind of relationship one has with one's colleagues. But given the reaction of at least one of this adviser's colleagues, I can certainly understand why Cohen would see sending this particular email as "nutty," if that's what he meant.
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